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“Digital Dawn: A Revolution in Movie Distribution?” 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How will the digital technology revolution impact the movie business?  Hollywood developed a 
highly successful industrial system that has functioned well for almost a century in the sense that 
it enabled the Major film studios to largely control and dominate the industry.  However, the new 
digital technology may now be propelling Hollywood toward the biggest technological transition 
since the creation of the studio system almost a century ago. For example, Major Hollywood 
studios are already beginning to provide video-on-demand (VOD) digital distribution of movies 
over the Internet. This article examines what is happening, and why.  It sets out the background 
and the incipient changes already occurring.  It makes an argument regarding the fundamental 
strategic dynamics, that acetate film was the key to the control of the Hollywood system, and 
speculates about how a shift away from acetate film to digital video may transform that system.  
The focus is on the impact on how the Major studios release and market their movies, and how 
new market and marketing opportunities for the low-budget independent filmmaking sector may 
arise.   
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Introduction 
 
As the world grows more affluent and globalization continues, there has been an enormous 
growth in the entertainment industry all around the world. (Eliashberg and Shugan 1997).  
Indeed, total worldwide spending on cinema tickets alone is approaching US $20 billion. 
Powerful Hollywood studios known as the “Majors” (as in the “Major” movie studios) have long 
dominated the movie industry, but can that dominance continue in a rapidly changing world? 
Will new digital technologies create a “digital dawn” of a broadened flourishing of filmmaking 
around the world by independent producers?  Or will the Majors manage the new technologies to 
move into “digital dominance,” and continue their market leadership, without suffering the fate of 
the major railroad companies bypassed by the development of the airlines?  
Who are the Majors? The big seven Hollywood studios (Disney, Fox, MGM/UA, Paramount, 
Sony (Columbia/Tristar), Universal and Warners) and their distribution arms are collectively 
described as “the Majors” and are members of the MPAA (Motion Picture Association of 
America).  All other producers are technically independent, although highly successful “Mini-
Majors” like New Line, Miramax and Revolution are either subsidiaries of the Majors or have 
close affiliations. Many other Hollywood-based independents have long-established strategic 
alliances with the Majors and operate essentially as satellites supplying product to them.  
Independent filmmaking is an important economic activity(Cicchetti 1995).  Most of the movies 
produced each year are independent features, but independent filmmakers working outside the 
Hollywood system find it difficult to achieve a theatrical release in international markets outside 
their own home territory, because they cannot secure a global distribution deal (Dale 1997, 
Dickson 2001). This is because an industry structure (and related marketing practices) have 
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evolved over eight decades creating systemic barriers that have severely disadvantaged smaller 
independent companies in all three key industry sectors – production, distribution and exhibition.  
The movie industry is however, undergoing fundamental change and the Internet is at the heart of 
the new distribution models that are emerging.   This article first overviews the current situation 
in the movie industry, then examines factors driving change, and finally speculates on likely 
futures for the industry. 
 
 
Figure 1    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Production Sector 
 
The producer finds and develops the script, controls the copyright, secures distribution, raises 
production finance, engages the cast and crew, manages the project to completion and helps 
promote the finished movie.  
 
The Distribution Sector 
 
The film distributor acquires, promotes and exploits movies through appropriate distribution 
channels  (cinemas, home video, cable TV, satellite TV, network TV) around the world. The 
Majors are vertically integrated and operate their own domestic distribution arms in the US and 
work together in strategic alliances in international markets.  
 
MOVIE INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
 
 
Production  Distribution  Exhibition 
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The Exhibition Sector 
Cinemas/Theatres exhibit movies to paying audiences. Box office (ticket) revenue is split 
between the distributor and exhibitor on a formula basis leaving a much smaller percentage for 
the exhibitor, so for them, candy bar revenues are critical. While nominally independent, the 
cinemas’ need to fill their movie theatres (“bums on seats”) puts them at the mercy of the Majors’ 
dominance over content and its distribution and marketing. 
Figure 2  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CURRENT MODEL FOR FILM DISTRIBUTION RELEASE SEQUENCE 
 
Producer’s Movie   Distributor  Exhibitor – Theatrical Release 
 
 
 
       Home Video – Rental / Sell-through 
 
 
 
       Pay-per-view 
 
 
 
       Cable TV / Satellite TV 
 
 
 
       Free-to-air Network TV 
 
 
 
       Syndicated TV 
 
 
 
       Other ancillary markets 
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There has traditionally been a time-based flow through the distribution channels, starting with 
theatrical release and taking up to several years to flow through each stage of distribution all the 
way all around the world.   
Pre-1990, the non-theatrical markets (video rental, cable, satellite, free-to-air TV) were 
considered to be ancillary markets.  However, in the nineties, the home video market that had 
been built on library rentals, experienced explosive growth following the introduction of “sell-
through” videos and when combined with the global penetration of subscription television, the 
fundamental economics of the industry were changed. Each year, less than half of the total films 
produced even receive a theatrical release; most go straight to video or they are made-for-TV. 
 
Hollywood controls the value chain through vertical integration 
 
In the earliest days of the industry, the Majors were able to master the art of making 
commercially successful movies and to develop an industry with critical mass that has traded 
almost unchallenged by serious international competition. They have maintained their market-
dominant positions through business strategies involving vertical integration and the development 
of massive economies of scale in both production and distribution that provide high barriers to 
entry to outsiders. 
Today, the Major movie studios are now part of very large and diverse media corporations  - 
AOL-Time-Warner, Viacom, Vivendi-Universal, Sony, Disney and News Corporation. These 
media giants also own many of the entertainment industry’s other important distribution channels 
including TV networks (ABC, CBS and Fox), leading music companies (Universal, Sony and 
Warner), book publishers (Harper Collins, Simon & Schuster, Houghton Mifflin) and theme 
parks. (Disney, Universal, Warner and MGM).  
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Their core business is “software” – creation of movie content in different forms that can then be 
exploited further down the value chain where the bulk of the profits are made, in distribution 
(video, cable and TV) and in retail (merchandising, music soundtracks, books, computer games, 
theme parks). A major blockbuster success like “Spiderman” that made US $800 million 
worldwide in the cinemas also built brand awareness that generated substantial additional 
revenues in these other markets and media. Conversely, the Majors are also prepared to use a 
movie’s release in the first market, the movie theatres, as a loss-leader because as a brand 
building exercise it will facilitate large revenues through the exploitation of the brand further 
down the value chain (Dale 1997,  Duncan 1998 a).   
 
The movie business is volatile, expensive and high-risk. 
The ongoing success of Hollywood has been founded on the seemingly unending ability of the  
 
Major studios to create an endless stream of hit movies and this provides an ongoing competitive  
 
edge over smaller, non-aligned independent producers.  
 
Average film production budgets have spiraled from $9.8 million in 1980 to an average of $58.8  
 
million in 2002 (for a Major studio movie).  This has been mainly due to a combination of rising  
 
salaries for top movie stars who can command $20 million per movie and to the use of costly  
 
digital special effects that enhance the entertainment value and help position the movie as a 
  
major event.  The global marketing costs of launching movies can also exceed the production  
 
budget. 
 
Past failures of big budget movies like Cleopatra and Heavens Gate threatened the very financial 
viability of the Majors that backed them.  Today, the financial risk for big budget movies, like 
“Pearl Harbor” ($150 million), are so high that the Majors’ have changed their business strategy.  
Historically, they financed in-house production of between 25-30 movies per year. Today they 
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are actually making fewer but much bigger budget movies that have the potential to become 
blockbusters, which can be exploited in all markets and media from theatres to music soundtracks 
to theme parks and merchandising.  The Majors  “pick up” (buy) independently produced product 
to maintain a broad film portfolio in order to keep their distribution pipelines full of new movies 
that will be attractive to theatrical, video and television markets. 
The business rationale is that profit margins from maintaining a larger in-house production 
portfolio are now not large enough due to the spiraling production and marketing costs. The 
Majors find it is more profitable to buy the other movies that they need to feed their distribution 
companies from high profile Hollywood based independent producers who operate basically as 
satellites of the Majors. These “independents,” raise their own production finance for their 
movies (which may include partial or total finance from the studio). This leaves the Majors to 
focus more on “the delivery” of the movies to the market, through their distribution networks and 
through their marketing (consistent with Friedman and Furey’s (2000) emphasis on channel 
focus).  
In sum, the volatility of the movie business and risk is managed through a strategy of 
diversification, vertical integration and careful financial management. The studios control their 
cash flow and their costs by controlling each part of the value chain(Dale 1997, Dickson 2001).  
They own substantial film libraries that provide a recurring source of income through ongoing 
sales to the post-theatrical media (cable, satellite, network TV). 
Today, the combined revenues for the non-theatrical markets for the average movie have become 
larger than the initial release of a movie in the theatrical market.  These revenues are now so large 
that the production and marketing costs for movies that even fail at the box office can often be 
recovered from non-theatrical revenue streams.  Television needs an ongoing supply of fresh new 
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product and so the Majors keep their product pipeline full and each of them distribute 25-30 new 
movies annually, which are sold in packages to non-theatrical markets.  
In standard distribution practice, the theatres and film distributor recoup all expenses and fees 
before net profits (if there are any) filter back to the actual production company.  Vertical 
integration and control of distribution channels means that each business unit within that value 
chain can legitimately deduct a series of sequential fees, charges and business expenses on the 
movie as it progresses through the value chain during the life of the product. Vertical integration 
provides the Majors with the benefits of large economies of scale and the ability to manage 
content and risks that are unavailable to smaller independent companies.  
The combined production output from the Majors and “mini-Majors” was 350 movies in 1998. 
By comparison, the annual output in European Union countries rose to 666 films in 1997, in the 
Far East 663 films were made, and the Indian film industry (“Bollywood”) makes over 800 
movies each year.  Whilst independents make more movies, more than two thirds of all films 
released into theatres come from the distribution arms of the Major studios. In spite of increased 
production output, most “foreign” national film industries experienced a decline in actual 
domestic box office market share in their own territories during the nineties. This was due to the 
marketing power of the Majors who continue their historic dominance of global film markets by 
controlling the channels of distribution. For example, in 2002, the seven Majors released a total 
of 220 movies and the top 19 movies accounted for 36% of the total annual box office in North 
America. Exhibitors rely heavily on blockbusters to fill their theatres and so the Majors dominate 
and can exploit the distribution channel to optimal advantage.   
How do independent films fare in such an industry landscape? 
Independent films are lower budget, often made without a major movie star and without special 
effects to attract audiences, and most have non-English dialogue. These factors combine to limit 
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the commercial potential in the all-important US market. The majority of independent producers 
around the world also don’t have the strategic relationship with the Major studios that many high-
profile Hollywood-based producers enjoy. They have to finance their films from other sources 
and seek distribution from smaller, independent film companies who lack the marketing power 
and influence of the Major distributors. 
About 15-16 new major feature films are introduced into the US theatrical marketplace each 
week. The pressure for available theatre screens from the major distributors means that even 
when a small independent film does gain a theatrical release, in most cases it isn’t supported by a 
major marketing campaign and if it doesn’t open successfully over the first weekend it is quickly 
replaced. The Majors have their pick of the best available release-dates from theatre chains that 
rely on them for regular product.  The Majors book their future releases well in advance, by the 
end of summer 2001, the following summer of 2002 was already 60% booked by the Major 
studios - a practice that limits theatrical release opportunities for small independent films.  
The proportion of all national screens that can be occupied by a new first-run independent title 
varies considerably from as low as 0.6 % for Japan and 1.17% in Italy up to 13.4% in Belgium 
and 13.8% in Australia. The EU average is around 7.5% (Screen Digest 2001). 
 
 
The root cause: Acetate film 
Hollywood derives its power from an entire industry structure that has evolved based around the 
use of acetate film as the fundamental medium of exchange. Film is expensive to buy, to develop, 
to transport, to store and to maintain and this favors the major studios whose size and diversity 
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enables them to achieve huge economies of scale in their global distribution networks and 
marketing - an advantage not available to smaller independents (Melick 2000). 
How will the digital revolution impact on the industry? 
If acetate film is the root cause of Hollywood dominance, then the new digital technologies could 
revolutionize all sectors - production, distribution and exhibition. Remember Schumpeter’s 
“creative destruction” based on innovation (Schumpeter 1975, Scherer 1984). 
 
“Digital freedom”: the production sector 
Many of the spectacular special effects have underpinned the recent commercial success of 
blockbuster movies were unimaginable even a decade ago. 
Filmmaking is the only art form where the artist, with rare exceptions, has personally been unable 
to afford the cost of the materials necessary to create their art.   However, with digital technology, 
even a 3 minute film produced by two filmmakers on their home computer using hardware and 
software bought for under US$10,000 can have amazing special effects worthy of a Hollywood 
blockbuster.  www.405themovie.com is about a jet aircraft making a crash landing on a LA 
freeway. It became an instant cult classic on the Internet attracting over 4 million downloads in 
three years. The introduction of low cost digital video cameras has lowered the cost of 
filmmaking and provided almost universal access. The next generation of moviemakers are 
already honing their skills on sophisticated but cheap digital video equipment.  
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Some powerful Hollywood producers believe that the transition to digital production and 
distribution will in fact democratize the industry (Swanson 2000), in the sense of giving 
filmmakers (who would otherwise be denied distribution) a voice by enabling them to find an 
audience for their films over the Internet.  
“Digital democracy”: the distribution sector 
The really revolutionary potential for change in business practices in the movie industry lies in 
the distribution sector, with the introduction of 1) Internet film distribution e.g. video-on-demand, 
and 2) digital cinema.  In the movie industry, film distribution costs are high. Distributors 
typically charge a distribution fee in the range of 30% - 40% of the gross film receipts to 
distribute acetate feature films around the world.  
The big attraction of digital is in the area of cost reduction.  Digital delivery is expected to save 
the Majors alone between US$700-800 million per annum (Perenson 2001, Goldsmith 1999).  
Current annual distribution costs for Hollywood based on film as the medium is estimated at $1.2 
billion. Digital delivery will mean that distributors save US$2000 on every print of the film plus 
the shipping costs to the theatres of around US$300 for each individual print (Brewin 2000).      
Global movie release and “day and date” across all media    
With digital distribution, a global release of a movie becomes a real and possibly commercially 
attractive possibility. With acetate film as the basic industry medium, it is currently cost 
prohibitive to realistically consider a global release for most movies. The marketing costs (known 
in the movie industry as P&A - prints and advertising) are too high.  A global digital theatrical 
release would however yield two distinct benefits that are currently not available.  Firstly, with a 
global release, simultaneous worldwide box office takings would help for faster recoupment of 
the massive movie production budgets than currently available through regionally staggered 
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release patterns. This would help reduce borrowings and interest due to financiers. Secondly, 
some of the potential impact of piracy could be reduced if the movie is launched simultaneously 
into the global marketplace.  A version from an early-release country could no longer be pirated 
for a later-release country. 
An interesting new option available through the exploitation of Internet distribution technology is 
to release a movie “day and date” with the cinema release in all media and in all markets 
simultaneously around the world (i.e. theatrical, home video, pay TV etc).  The major objection 
to this strategy is likely to be: Will a day and date global release cannibalize sales in non-
theatrical media?  The key issue here is, are the primary market segments different for theatrical, 
home video, PayTV/Satellite TV, VOD etc?  Even if the likely viewing segment for a given 
movie is the same across some channels, that segment may still participate across channels 
anyway.  There could be less cannibalization than synergy, and enormous economies of scale in 
promotion because the movie needs only to be promoted once (i.e., not promoted anew each time 
it is released through a new channel). Would it not be more efficient if movie distribution could 
eliminate the staff overhead that currently exists in maintaining separate marketing teams for 
each of those media markets around the world? 
Internet film distribution can also cut out the middleman 
Direct distribution of movies over the Web provides incredible new opportunities, for Majors and 
independents alike.  With the introduction of video-on-demand (VOD), rather than licensing its 
movies to a third party website operator,  five of the Majors are offering movies as digital 
downloads (like a video rental) from their own website – Movielink.com, but they keep all of the 
money. (Sweeting 2000)  Put another way, the Internet and World Wide Web provide businesses 
with the opportunity to disintermediate the value chain and eliminate the middleman (Chircu and 
Kauffman 2000, Brandtweiner 1998, Gelman 1996).  “The Economist” observed that “more 
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capacity means more revenue from the same content. Everything-on-demand means greater 
convenience for consumers, and hence bigger sales. And the retailer’s margin is up for 
grabs.”(Duncan 1998 b) 
In August-September 2001, two different consortiums consisting of all of the Majors studios 
announced plans to provide digitally delivered  VOD services direct to the consumer over the 
Internet.  Universal, Paramount, Sony Entertainment (Columbia-TriStar), Warner Brothers and 
MGM/UA combined to form MovieFly which was later launched as Movielink.com in November 
2002 (Orwall 2001) whilst Disney and Fox initially teamed in the second consortium to form 
Movies.com (Healey and Verrier 2001) but Fox later withdrew. Worried by the popularity at that 
time of Napster and the threat of digital piracy, Movielink executives admitted that they were 
motivated to move quickly in order to head off a similar problem for movies on the Web by 
providing a business where consumers can obtain movie content online legitimately (Rich 2001). 
Movielink’s VOD services are based on an open-access IP (Internet protocol) based system that  
relies on consumers that want to use VOD having broadband access to the Internet (Bond 2001).  
In 2002, the US market was 16.8 million broadband households (15.4% penetration of TV 
households) and there were 5.5 million VOD households (5% penetration) generating $480 
million annual revenues.   A McKinsey report on broadband media entitled “Look before you 
leap” indicated that 40 million households will gain access to broadband in the next three to five 
years (Christofferson and Gatzke 2001).   
With Movielink, for a fee that has parity with pay-per-view by cable or satellite, consumers are 
able to download movies in the form of a digitally compressed and encrypted file to their hard 
drive where it can remain for a 30-day period. Once the file is opened, the movie needs to be 
played within 24 hours and can be viewed on either a PC or a television that is connected to the 
 14 
 
 
PC.  The consumer uses either Windows Media Player or Real Networks Real Player to play the 
movie, which takes between  20 and 40 minutes to download.  
The studios selected downloading as the preferred VOD approach because it not only offers 
greater picture quality than streaming video on the Internet, but also enables the studios to 
provide similar on-screen functions that an existing VCR or DVD player offers e.g. start, stop, 
rewind.  The studios  appear to see VOD as a new and complimentary distribution channel. 
Movies are available at about the same time as they are currently offered on pay-per-view TV 
(30-45 days after the video release), a strategy designed to protect the studios highly profitable 
Home Video/DVD business operations by minimizing the danger of cannibalization of their 
home video market (Orwall 2001). 
The Majors are now able to establish direct relationships with VOD customers, monitoring their 
purchasing behavior on line and developing consumer profiles to use for highly targeted direct 
marketing pitches. Never before have the studios been able to develop direct relationships with 
movie goers, and this could help to make marketing expenditures much more effective and 
efficient in the longer term (Sweeting 2001).   A major constraint to the arrival of VOD has been 
download lag time. Today’s download times are however getting shorter as compression software 
performance improves.   
At the same time that the Majors launched their VOD services, a software innovation called 
Adam’s Platform emerged that may herald a technical solution to the streaming problem and 
could yet render the Majors’ download-encrypted delivery strategy obsolete. A successful 
demonstration of the Adam’s Platform was witnessed by independent observers (Deloitte 
consultants, movie industry executives and Hollywood Reporter staff). They saw full screen 
video streamed in real time from a server 1,000 kilometres away using Internet protocols and a 
standard PC, analogue phone line and modem.  What made the demonstration remarkable was 
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that “the images were far superior to the usual video streaming experienced over the Net, even 
though (Adam) Clark used only a slow, 28.8 kps modem, a generic graphics card and a basic 
Apple MacIntosh G4” (Cochrane and Van Niekerk 2001).  That a simple 28.8 kbps modem could 
deliver such fast and high quality images undermines the need for broadband.(George 2001) 
The CEO of Media World Broadcasting recently confirmed that the company is launching 
Adam’s Platform commercially in mid-2003. It will not only provide a faster, better service to 
consumers, it is also potentially a cheaper technical solution than the VOD download option 
because it needs no piracy encryption software. And, if it is mass marketed effectively, it means 
that every independent filmmaker has the potential to distribute their films from their own website 
direct to the consumer and bypass the middleman.   
Whether the Adam’s Platform proves in practice to be the great compression breakthrough, or it 
is an invention by someone else at a slightly later time, it would appear that streaming VOD with 
its immediacy and freedom from piracy may well be here soon. 
Figure  3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A new distribution paradigm?  
The VOD paradigm itself is, in fact, not new.  Internet film distributors like Atom Films and 
IFilm have distributed short films online direct-to-consumers for some years, and Cinema 
Now.com, SightSound.com and MovieFlix.com currently stream movies for public consumption 
MODEL FOR DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER INDEPENDENT MOVIES-ON-DEMAND 
 
Independent Film  Internet Distribution  Independent movies-on-demand 
available direct to consumer’s 
home PC or to an Internet 
enabled large screen TV offering 
streaming or digital download 
options using broadband cable or 
satellite transmission delivery 
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over the Web, though none of these have yet achieved major commercial success. The key 
problem to-date has been image quality and that gets back to the issue of broadband access and 
compression algorithms. 
The nature of digital and the World Wide Web lowers the barriers to entry  
The actual nature of the World Wide Web lowers the barriers to entry because unlike the real 
world where land and transportation channels are private or public property that can be owned, 
blocked or controlled - nobody owns the Internet and nobody controls it. The Net is accessible to 
everybody with a PC and the relatively modest financial resources needed to develop a website.  
Unlike real-world distribution, where small films may be blocked and never be offered a 
theatrical release, the Majors simply cannot stop an independent distributor like an Atom Films or 
an individual producer from developing a web site and distributing their own movies direct to the 
consumer. Sufficient money, effective brand building and a Web-savvy promotional strategy then 
become the key success factors to marketing a movie on the Web.  
Whilst the Majors would likely view VOD as a sustaining technology, in this context, the Internet 
has the potential to become a disruptive technology, Web delivery of movies seems to fit the 
typical pattern that Clayton Christensen observed in his research (Christensen 1997). 
Christensen’s central thesis asserts that even the best companies can fail because they do 
everything right. They listen to their customers and invest in new technologies but can still lose 
market leadership when they confront disruptive changes in technology and market structure.  He 
cites examples of such innovations overshooting the market i.e. leaping ahead of their market’s’ 
current needs and the result is insufficient demand from their best customers to make the new 
product profitable. Consequently, the market leader terminates its interest in the new product, 
which in turn creates opportunity for other smaller firms to find a niche in the market to exploit 
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the new technology. This tends to occur at the low quality end of the market where new uses for 
the product are found by an entirely different set of customers.   
Web distribution of movies has already spawned many start-up businesses that distribute and 
exhibit short films and old feature films on the Web. The Majors have to-date, showed  no 
interest in this tier of the market because it does not appear to serve the mass movie going 
audience and there is little apparent possibility of current business models generating large 
enough profits.  For the Majors to become involved at this point in time could be an irrational 
investment on their part and would be out of alignment with their existing value networks. 
The technology also appears to be overshooting the market. The software available to view 
movies over the Web is relatively easy to use and broadband enables consumers to download 
movies of near DVD quality, but mass audiences viewing habits still currently revolve around a 
trip to the movie theatre, renting a video or watch movies available on TV.  A standard “diffusion 
of innovation” S curve may occur over time, starting with adoption by innovators, through early 
adopters, the middle majority, and lastly, the laggards (Rogers 1995). 
Yet, these websites like CinemaNow.com Atom Films and IFilm.com appear to already be 
developing communities of users interested in consuming this type of product and are therefore 
fulfilling an entertainment need of what is currently a niche audience.  The “switching costs” 
(Porter 1980)  for this segment of innovators and early adopters are relatively low.   
The infrastructure switching costs required are a broadband Internet connection to enable a 
quality viewing experience on a home computer.  Other switching costs for this particular 
segment are also likely to be relatively low because this Internet-savvy segment is unlikely to be 
“put-off” by consuming movies in a non-theatre environment. They actively are seeking out this 
experience. 
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From the general consumer perspective, the emotional switching costs are likely to be higher (the 
choice between consuming movies on a home PC versus the more familiar and social big screen 
theatre experience).  However, more people around the world now consume movies at home on a 
small screen (TV, video, cable, satellite) than they do watching them in theatrical release.    
Switching costs for “self distribution” on the Internet for established producers who are 
commercially successful and well networked into the Hollywood Majors are high. There will be 
little incentive for them to see “web delivery” of movies as little more than another embryonic 
ancillary marketing channel.  Standard film distribution contracts from the Majors require 
producers to agree to give the distribution company all rights, across all media, so it is likely that 
most high profile producers will NOT switch because it is not in their interest as producers to do 
so.  Seeking to withhold potentially lucrative future VOD rights from a distribution deal with one 
of the Majors would risk alienating the producer from the studio that was backing them.  
Digital democracy in distribution ? 
Is commercially successful self-distribution by independent filmmakers feasible?  With digital 
distribution capabilities becoming available, the independent producer who has not got a 
distribution deal for their film has three options.  
1) They can choose to self distribute their film over the Web on their own website (Lancaster 
and Conti 2001). 
2) They can find an existing on-line distributor who will exploit this channel on their behalf.  
e.g.  www.IFilm.com  www.atomfilms.com  www.cinemanow.com . 
3)  They can partner with other independents in the formation of a co-operative online 
distribution company that agrees to market the film and to take their future films for 
Internet distribution.  
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Self-distribution – salvation for the small independent? 
For ultra low budget films vying for a release in the theatrical market, an absence of movie stars, 
a short product lifecycle, enormous pressure for available theatre screens in a crowded market 
and high marketing launch costs are all significant barriers to them achieving that goal and 
becoming a hit.  
Direct to consumer, self-distribution over the Web therefore may in future present a real 
commercial alternative for independents with very low budget films that are unable to obtain a 
theatrical distribution deal or sales to other ancillary markets like TV, cable, or video. At present, 
unless the movie has extraordinary commercial qualities that can be effectively exploited in the 
marketing launch (e.g. Blair Witch), the economics of a theatrical release just don’t work for ultra 
low budget features, which is why they find it almost impossible to obtain a distribution deal.   
It may in future become a more profitable business model for independent producers of ultra low 
budget movies to by-pass traditional channels and self-distribute their movie on the Internet 
direct to the consumer or to independent theaters. However, there will be challenges of skillfully 
designing and promoting their website, and breaking through the clutter or “digital chaos” of 
perhaps thousands of independent movie websites that overwhelm, confuse and put-off 
customers. 
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Figure 4   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On-line distributors – the cybermediary 
For those independent filmmakers not knowledgeable enough to market a website themselves, 
they could seek out an on-line independent distributor with a recognizable brand name and 
engage their services. These distributors could either pay a rental fee to Movielink  or 
CinemaNow to use their online distribution system or alternatively  they  could use streaming 
software to deliver their movies as VOD.  Streaming enables consumers to watch a piece of the 
movie while the rest of it “buffers” behind that segment and downloads in real time, so a 
broadband connection  is essential.  
These online distributors will need to build brand awareness and brand equity in order to attract 
the traffic needed to sustain their business (Keller 1998). Companies like IFilm are already well 
placed to begin to evolve into online feature film distribution for small independently produced 
features.  If they can develop these sites as a recognizable portal for low budget independent 
films, their websites can become “attractors” for the online movie viewer community that likes 
non-mainstream movies, this can facilitate the development of a market that could take off.  Like 
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all Internet based businesses, most of these online film distribution companies are struggling to 
survive and find a business model that will make them economically viable.  But by building 
brand names now with the “innovator buyers”, future technological developments may allow 
them a head start into leading the way into a future mass market. 
A model for co-operative on-line film distribution  
The original United Artists might serve as a model for a third option (Brown 2001). UA was an 
independent distribution company formed in 1918 by four of the biggest movie personalities of 
the day because they the Majors were taking too much of the profit on the movies that they made. 
Similarly, a number of independents today might choose to work together co-operatively to 
partner in an on-line distribution entity for marketing purposes in the way that milk co-operatives 
often market product on behalf of farmers. 
“Digital hegemony”: The majors strike back 
 “Digital hegemony” might be a counter strategy used by the Majors if the “Digital Democrats” 
begin to succeed in developing a commercially successful new market by attacking the lower 
ends of their key market segments. In the late eighties the Majors began to acquire the most 
successful art film distributors to remove the competition, they might apply the same tactics to 
the emerging Web distribution firms in order to protect their position and achieve a digital 
dominance. 
However, as Christensen warns, with a disruptive technology, by the time the established firms 
take an interest in the emerging market it is often too late. 
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Digital Cinema 
The benefits of digital cinema include the elimination of film prints, lower handling costs, lower 
theatre construction costs in future; more consistent image quality, improved sound, more 
efficient response to demand, potential new revenue sources for exhibitors and new release 
options. (Baughman 2000)   In the exhibition sector, the massive cost of conversion of theatre 
equipment on a global basis is the critical issue and who pays for the transitioning costs is the 
subject of hot debate in the industry. Conversion is estimated to occur over a 10-20 year time 
frame with film playing alongside digitally projected content at cinemas during the transition 
years. (Crabtree 2001)  Estimates of the up-front transitioning costs to theater chains to convert to 
digital are US $150,000-$200,000 per screen for the digital projectors, with an extra $100,000 
required to provide the necessary server that enables the system to run from a central 
processor.(Hanrahan 2000, Perenson 2001)  Digital projector costs are however expected to 
reduce  significantly over ten years. 
Marketing and Programming implications 
Digital delivery over the Web can facilitate the emergence of digital cinema on the one hand and 
provide a video-on-demand service direct to the consumer on the other.  For filmmakers, the Web 
is a global marketplace through which films can be exhibited to international audiences 24/7.   
Mahadevan proposes that the Internet economy has “divided the overall market structure into 
three broad structures; portals, market makers and product/service providers” (Mahadevan 2000).  
Portals build communities and play the primary role of funneling customers in a targeted manner 
towards sites of interest.  Market Makers differ in that they possess a lot of domain knowledge 
and provide value through relationships based on transactional security and trust. Product/service 
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providers gain their edge by customizing their information system and processes to match 
customer’s requirements. 
Under the current business models, Atom Films and IFilm and many other smaller on line 
distributors are effectively de-facto portals. They have developed their own brands and provide 
the retailing intermediary value of pre-screening for product quality. In doing so, they are 
developing a brand identity for some of the generation of emerging filmmakers whose talents can 
be viewed by downloading their films. Some of the filmmakers on display may go on to achieve 
bigger things in the industry if they get “discovered”.   
Hollywood’s undeniable marketing supremacy and the collective confidence of the studios were 
badly shaken by the huge commercial success of the low budget horror movie “The Blair Witch 
Project” (Lyman 2001).  The real business lesson in this instance was that a small independent 
producer and distributor could outwit and out-think the Hollywood marketing juggernaut by 
using street smart, below-the-line guerilla marketing tactics and by exploiting the marketing 
potential of the Internet effectively.   
In the wake of potential “digital chaos”, not only may movie portals emerge to cut down the 
overwhelming number of choices consumers may face, but opinion leaders (movie critics) may 
play a huge role.  The quality independent film could be submitted to them and if it earned their 
recommendation and they provided a hyperlink, there could be a flow-through of traffic to the 
movie website.  Consider the impact of a website bearing the imprimator “Roger Ebert 
Recommends…” 
New flexibility for programming and increased theatre profitability?         
Greater flexibility and diversity in theatre programming should also occur as a result of digital 
distribution over the Web. By eliminating the cost of a “print” and replacing it with digital 
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distribution, it would reduce some of the financial loss suffered by a Major due to a box office 
failure.   This might enable the theatre to expedite the removal of that movie instead of having to 
wait until the end of the minimum run, thus freeing up valuable screen time.  This would signal a 
fundamental shift in power back to the theatre operator. This in-turn, should result in more 
flexible and diverse programming that can be customized to specifically suit local market tastes.  
Exhibitors would then be able to expand their range of programming to include non-mainstream 
independent films, foreign films, documentaries, short films or even “live” sporting and 
entertainment events. These could be screened in digital cinemas as long as they originate on, or 
were transferred to digital video tape or recordable DVD, for Internet delivery to the theatre so 
that viewers may enjoy the big screen theatre experience.  This is potentially a revolution in the 
role of the exhibitor.   
Improved local marketing at the cinema level 
Local marketing practices should also improve and so too could returns to the producer.  “By 
diversifying and increasing the product supply, digital technologies will create an avenue for 
theatres to choose product on a more competitive basis. Promotions will shift from a focus on mass-
marketing to targeted local campaigns that encourage development of a one-to-one relationship 
between theatre and patron” (Melick 2001).       
Conclusion 
Industry leaders like George Lucas and Francis Ford Coppola are championing the cause of 
digitally produced movies to replace film as the industry medium. They see both new creative 
opportunities from the digital filmmaking process that traditional film cannot provide as well as 
more flexibility in actual production and cost savings.  The revolutionary potential of digital 
technology for the movie industry however will likely occur with the ability to distribute movies 
directly to movie theatres over the Internet and also direct to the consumer’s home with VOD.  
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124 digital cinema screens were operating around the world in 2002. It is a reality.  It is 
beginning to happen now. 
The Major studios stand to save US $700–$800 million per year through digital distribution to 
theatres, although the issue of who should pay for the transitioning costs is as yet unresolved.  
And as the broadband market grows in size, the studios should add additional lucrative revenue 
streams through their new VOD services.   Intenet distribution provides the opportunity for 
Majors to exploit their movies on a global basis and release them “day and date” across all 
theatrical and non-theatrical media if that optimizes sales and profits.  
The exhibition sector now faces the prospect of growing pressure from the Majors to convert to 
digital cinema over the next two decades.  The elimination of film prints and replacement by 
digital transmission direct to the cinemas undermines the historic rationale for the minimum play 
clause in the standard licensing agreement between the distributor and the exhibitor.  This could 
help to free up screen time for the exhibitor when movies that fail at the box office after they are 
launched are removed much more quickly and replaced by other product that may prove to be 
commercially more successful. This in turn might shift the balance of power in favor of 
exhibitors who often lack sufficient leverage within the distribution channel to greatly influence 
the distributor’s decisions.  This would also provide incentive for the exhibitor to become more 
actively involved in local marketing and in selecting independent productions most suitable for 
their market.  
In production and distribution, for small independents and emerging filmmakers the 
comparatively low cost of digital video production opens up the filmmaking possibilities to a 
much wider mass market.  Digital distribution and developments like VOD and Adams Platform 
open up new possibilities of relatively cheap access via the World Wide Web to global markets 
for those independents unable to gain access to global audiences for their movies via other 
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channels. The Internet is potentially a level playing field for the independent filmmaker. It 
reduces barriers to entry by being accessible to all and not being owned or controlled by any 
central authority or by private corporations.  Digital products are by their nature, far cheaper to 
distribute than tangible products if the technology for effective delivery exists. The Web provides 
the channel and the means of delivery is provided by software developments like the Adams 
Platform.  
Will the “digital dawn” bring about “digital freedom” in film production and a proliferation of 
interesting new independent films, made accessible to viewers on the Internet through a “digital 
democracy” in distribution, or will the ensuing clutter lead to “digital chaos”?  Alternatively, will 
the Majors yet again retain their industry dominance through new ventures like Movielink or 
through  “(digital) hegemony” by simply acquiring successful digital brands? 
 
Current players in the movie industry can either plan for these potential scenarios, or be sidelined 
by them.  New players can seize the opportunities, or watch the opportunities pass them by.
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